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Abstract
In this paper we determine the noise properties needed for unconditional security for the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-
Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system using simple statistical analysis. It has already been shown using physical laws
that resistors and Johnson-like noise sources provide unconditional security. However real implementations use artificial
noise generators, therefore it is a question if other kind of noise sources and resistor values could be used as well. We
answer this question and in the same time we provide a theoretical basis to analyze real systems as well.
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Introduction
Communication security is getting more and more important in
many different applications including electronic banking, protect-
ing personal data, securing intellectual property of companies,
transmission of medical data and many more. The Kirchhoff-Law-
Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol was introduced as a low cost
unconditionally secure key exchange protocol using only passive
components: four resistors, two switches and interconnecting wires
[1]. The protocol is based only on the laws of classical physics and
has been introduced as an inexpensive alternative to quantum
communicators. The first real implementation has been shown a
few years after its discovery [2,3] and it has inspired the
development of another secret key exchanged method [4]. There
are many potential applications including securing computers,
algorithms and hardware (memories, processors, keyboards, mass
storage media) [5], key distribution over the Smart Grid [6],
ethernet cables [7], uncloneable hardware keys [8]. Several attack
methods has been discussed [9–14], however the ideal KLJN
system is found to be secure. Debates are still going on [15,16] and
recent papers discuss practical considerations for the applications
[17,18].
The KLJN key exchange protocol is rather simple. During the
communication a secret key is generated and shared between the
two communicating parties, Alice and Bob. The system consists of
two communicators and a transmission wire, see Fig. 1. Each
communicator includes two resistors RL and RH and two series
voltage noise sources VLA(t), VHA(t) and VLB(t), VHB(t) representing
the thermal noise of the resistors at Alice and Bob, respectively:
SL(f )~4kTRL ð1Þ
SH(f )~4kTRH ð2Þ
where SL( f ) is the power spectral density of the voltage noise
sources VLA(t), VLB(t) and SH( f ) is the power spectral density of the
voltage noise sources VHA(t), VHB(t); k is the Boltzmann constant
and T is the temperature.
A switch is used to select one of the resistors to be connected to
the wire connecting the two communicators, see Fig. 1. At the
beginning of each bit exchange, both Alice and Bob connect a
resistor (RH or RL) to the wire. If both, Alice and Bob connect the
higher value resistor, the voltage noise level will be high in the
wire. If they both connect the low value resistor, the voltage noise
will be low. If they connect different value resistors, the noise level
will be intermediate and this is invariant if the resistors are
swapped. [1,13]. This level can also be identified by the
eavesdropper, Eve, however she cannot determine who has
chosen the low value resistor. For this reason, this is the secure
state that can be used for key exchange.
Note that in real applications the noise would be too small,
therefore artificial noise generators are used to provide large
enough signals in a given frequency band. In this case, the noise
equivalent temperature is above 109 K [1]. On the other hand
generators can enhance the security and offer new schemes with
higher practical security in the non-ideal situations [17].
Results
According to the papers about the KLJN communication
method the artificial noise generators are only used to emulate
high temperatures, so they must generate Johnson-like noise.
Therefore the security proof based on physical laws remains valid
[1]. Our approach is in some sense opposite to the previous ones,
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when security has been proven for the given noise properties. Here
we determine what the requirements of noise properties for
unconditional security are. On the other hand, our analysis is
based on statistical methods instead of physical laws of thermo-
dynamics, therefore it can be more easily understandable for
computer engineers and software engineers.
Let us assume that the system is operated in the LH situation,
when Alice has switched on the lower value resistor and noise,
while Bob uses the higher value resistor and noise as shown in
Fig. 1.
In this case Eve measures the following voltage VE(t) and current
IE(t) (flowing from Bob’s side towards Alice) in the wire:
VE(t)~
VLA(t):RHzVHB(t):RL
RLzRH
ð3Þ
and
IE(t)~
VHB(t){VLA(t)
RLzRH
ð4Þ
where VLA(t) and VHB(t) are the voltage noise signals at Alice and
Bob, respectively. She can have two hypotheses: the correct one
and the opposite. She can calculate the statistics of Alice’s voltage
noise for both cases. Since she knows the resistor values and the
used voltage noise statistics, it is clear, that she will know that her
assumption is wrong, if she gets invalid values during her
calculations. For the correct assumption she must get correct
results of course. Let us see what happens in the case of the wrong
hypothesis. In this case Eve assumes that the high value resistor has
been chosen by Alice. Therefore she calculates Alice’s noise
voltage VA(t) as:
VA(t)~VE(t){IE(t):RH
~
VLA(t):RHzVHB(t):RL
RLzRH
z
VHB(t){VLA(t)
RLzRH
RH
ð5Þ
VA(t)~
VLA(t):2:RHzVHB(t): RH{RLð Þ
RLzRH
ð6Þ
VA(t)~VLA(t):
2:RH
RLzRH
zVHB(t):
RH{RL
RLzRH
ð7Þ
The variance is given by the sum of variances:
s2A~s
2
L
: 2
:RH
RLzRH
 2
zs2H
: RH{RL
RLzRH
 2
ð8Þ
where sA
2 is the variance of VA(t) and sL
2 and sH
2 are the
variances of the voltage noise VLA(t) and VHB(t), respectively.
The communication can only be secure if sA= sH, otherwise
Eve will know that Alice connected the low value resistor and
voltage generator to the wire. Substituting this into Eq. (8) yields:
s2H
s2L
1{
RH{RL
RLzRH
 2 !
~
2:RH
RLzRH
 2
ð9Þ
s2H
s2L
~
2:RHð Þ2
RLzRHð Þ2{ RH{RLð Þ2
~
4:R2H
R2Lz2
:RL:RHzR2H{ R
2
H{2
:RL:RHzR2L
 
ð10Þ
s2H
s2L
~
RH
RL
ð11Þ
or in other form
sH
sL
~
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
RH
RL
r
ð12Þ
Therefore the noise amplitude must depend on the resistance as in
the case of thermal noise; it must be proportional to the square
root of the resistance. Otherwise the communication is certainly
unsecure.
In the following we check how the security depends on the
probability distribution of the noise. When the eavesdropper
makes the correct assumption, she can calculate the noise signal
that Alice is using exactly; therefore she gets the correct probability
distribution of course. When she makes the wrong assumption
then she obtains:
VA(t)~VL(t):
2:RH
RLzRH
zVH(t):
RH{RL
RLzRH
ð13Þ
The probability density pA(x) of VA(t) is given by the convolution
of the probability densities of the two independent terms in Eq.
(13). If p(x) is the probability density function with unity variance,
a~sL:
2:RH
RLzRH
ð14Þ
and
Figure 1. The KLJN secure communication system.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096109.g001
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b~sH:
RH{RL
RLzRH
ð15Þ
then
s2A~a
2zb2 ð16Þ
where sA2 is the variance of VA(t), and
pA(x)~
ð?
{?
1
a
p
x’
a
 
: 1
b
p
x{x’
b
 
dx’ ð17Þ
If Eq. (12) is satisfied, then sA= sH, that is needed for secure
communication. Furthermore pA(x) measured by Eve must also be
identical to the probability density function pH(x) of the noise
voltages VHA(t) and VHB(t), otherwise Eve can detect that her
assumption is wrong. Therefore using Eqs. (16) and (17) pA(x) can
be expressed as.
pA(x)~pH(x)~
1
sH
p
x
sH
 
~
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2zb2
q p xffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2zb2
q
0
B@
1
CA ð18Þ
and finally we get
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2zb2
q p xffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2zb2
q
0
B@
1
CA~ ð?
{?
1
a
p
x’
a
 
: 1
b
p
x{x’
b
 
dx’. (19)
Discussion
Eq. (19) is valid for normal distribution only [19], therefore we
can conclude that the noise sources VLA(t), VLB(t) and VHA(t), VHB(t)
must have normal distribution and the ratio of their amplitude
must be equal to the square root of the ratio of the corresponding
resistor values. In other words, Johnson-like noise must be used for
the secure key exchange in the KLJN system. Note that although
several other distributions – for example Cauchy-distribution –
satisfy the condition that the convolution in Eq. (19) does not
change the type of distribution, however the finite variance
required by energetic considerations is only provided by normal
distribution.
It is easy to see that for example random numbers with uniform
distribution can’t be used for secure communication. In this case
Eq. (17) gives a trapezoidal probability density function for pA(x) as
shown on Fig. 2, therefore its deviation from pH(x) can be very
easily detected. We have developed a simple software application
written in LabVIEW that can be used to simulate the KLJN
protocol [20]. Normal or uniform distribution can be selected and
the values of RL, RH, amplitude of VLA(t), VLB(t) and VHA(t), VHB(t)
can be arbitrarily chosen. The application performs Eve’s
calculation of VA(t) for both hypotheses, and plots the correspond-
ing measured amplitudes and probability densities.
Limitations and Open Questions
We have presented a mathematical statistical approach to
determine the noise properties and resistor values required for
secure communication and the results are in agreement with the
original physical approach [1]. On the other hand our work does
not address the question of complete security.
Considerable additional work could be carried out to investigate
several attack types with similar approach. For example, in
practical applications the effect of resistor inaccuracies, wire
resistances can also be analyzed using our method; Eq. (8) can be
applied to find the difference between the observed and expected
variances, sA
2 and sH
2, respectively. This means that the
information leak due to these inaccuracies can be estimated. On
the other hand, if the desired security level is given, the required
resistor values and accuracy of the components can be obtained.
Furthermore one can consider correlation properties, band-
width of the noise sources that is important in practical
applications and discussed in several publications.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown a mathematical statistical
approach to find out what kind of noise sources are required for
secure communications in the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise
unconditionally secure key exchange system. In agreement with
the results can be found in the literature we found that the noise
amplitude must scale with the square root of the corresponding
resistor value and Gaussian noise sources must be used.
Note that our approach can serve as a starting point to
quantitatively analyze several attack types in practical applications.
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